
A restructure that became a live psychosocial risk case study
In September 2025, days after regulator ASIC handed ANZ a record $240 million penalty for misconduct including falsely reported bond trading volumes and unconscionable conduct toward the federal government, new CEO Nuno Matos announced the bank would cut approximately 3,500 roles and 1,000 contractor positions over the following year. The program was set to run its course by September 2026 - this month.
What's happened in between is a useful, uncomfortable case study for anyone responsible for managing psychosocial risk during organisational change - not because ANZ is unusual, but because the pattern is so common, and because the union representing affected staff put numbers on the harm.
What the Finance Sector Union found
The Finance Sector Union (FSU) lodged a Fair Work Commission dispute soon after the announcement, alleging ANZ had failed to properly consult staff before going public with the cuts. FSU national president Wendy Streets said workers "found out their jobs were gone through news alerts on their phones" rather than through direct conversation with their employer.
By November, the union had escalated with survey data from around 200 affected employees, and the picture was stark. Eighty per cent reported daily nervousness while waiting to learn their fate. Eighty-one per cent said executive communication had been neither timely nor transparent. And 49 per cent said they didn't feel safe raising concerns at all, for fear of how it might be held against them.
The qualitative detail matches the numbers. One worker described the process as "chaos - roles are changing weekly, workloads are huge, and no one knows who will still have a job next month." Another said their wellbeing "hasn't been considered at all, not even a text or email to ask if I'm okay." Streets called it "probably the worst time I've ever seen for our members at ANZ."
ANZ's position throughout has been that it met its obligations: the bank says it has "consistently engaged with our staff and the union" and is "confident we have met all of our consultation obligations." By late October, more than 30 per cent of targeted roles had already gone, along with all 1,000 contractor positions - while the bank booked a $414 million charge for the redundancies in its FY25 results, alongside a 10 per cent profit decline.
The hazards this opens up - and why they're not optional extras
Strip away the ANZ specifics and this is a straightforward illustration of three recognised psychosocial hazards colliding at once. Job insecurity - the day-to-day uncertainty of not knowing whether your role will exist next month - sits at the centre of it. Poor organisational change management shows up in exactly the way workers describe learning about the cuts: through news alerts and group chats rather than planned, supported conversations. And poor organisational justice is what you get when nearly half your affected workforce doesn't trust the process enough to speak up.
None of these are soft HR concerns. Under work health and safety law, a person conducting a business or undertaking has a duty (WHS Act s47) to consult workers when making decisions that are likely to affect their health and safety - and the model Managing Psychosocial Hazards at Work Code of Practice is explicit that this extends to "organisational restructures, changes to staffing levels, new reporting arrangements and work locations." The code names insufficient consultation, and a lack of information or support during change, as the defining features of poor organisational change management as a hazard in its own right. Consultation isn't a courtesy during a restructure; it's the control.
What this means for your workplace
Most employers running a restructure will never generate ANZ's headlines, but the underlying dynamic is common to almost any redundancy, merger, or major re-org. A few things the ANZ case makes concrete:
Consultation has to be an ongoing conversation built into the change timeline before a date is set - not a single announcement followed by silence. Employers should be tracking psychological safety signals through a restructure the same way they'd track any other project risk: pulse surveys, EAP usage, absenteeism, and direct feedback channels, reviewed on a schedule, not just at the end. And it has to be genuinely safe for someone to ask "what does this mean for me" without it feeling career-limiting - which means a channel that isn't just the manager who's delivering the news.
The ANZ dispute is still playing out. But the survey data is already a reminder that how you run a restructure is itself a psychosocial hazard control decision, with real, measurable consequences either way.


